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recusal of the members of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
SACK, Circuit Judge: 
 These appeals arise from an adversary proceeding related to the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceedings of debtor Thomas D. Arbogast ("Thomas") in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  At issue in the adversary 
proceedings were alleged fraudulent transfers made by Thomas to an account that he and 
his wife, Mary Claire Arbogast ("Mary Claire"), held as tenants by the entireties (the  
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"Entireties Account" or the "Account").  The Bankruptcy Court (Markovitz, J.) found that 
there had been fraudulent transfers in the amount of $143,389.10.  The bankruptcy court 
entered judgment in that amount in favor of plaintiff Natalie Lutz Cardiello, who is the 
Chapter 7 Trustee in Thomas’s bankruptcy action, and against Thomas and Mary Claire 
as owners by the entireties.  The Trustee appealed that judgment to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the Arbogasts cross-
appealed; the district court (McVerry, J.) affirmed.  The Trustee appeals from that 
judgment, and the Arbogasts again cross-appeal.  We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
 A.  Proceedings in State Court 
 The bankruptcy proceedings that underlie this appeal are part of the fallout from a 
landlord-tenant dispute between TrizecHahn Gateway LLC ("Trizec") -- a commercial 
landlord -- and Titus & McConomy LLP ("T&M") -- a no-longer-extant Pittsburgh law 
firm.  In 2000, Trizec brought suit in a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas against 
T&M and its general partners, including Thomas, in their individual capacities.  The 
court found in favor of Trizec, and, in 2006, entered final judgment in the amount of 
$3.27 million.  Thomas was among the partners upon whom the judgment imposed joint 
and several liability. 
 In 2007, as part of its effort to recover on that judgment, Trizec brought a 
fraudulent transfer action against Thomas and Mary Claire in the Court of Common 
Pleas.  Trizec alleged that Thomas had been depositing his salary from his new employer,  
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Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, into a bank account that he and Mary Claire held 
as tenants by the entireties.  Trizec contended that these deposits constituted fraudulent 
transfers under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Statute ("PUFTA"), 12 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 5101-10. 
 Before the parties could litigate the fraudulent transfer action, however, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the Court of Common Pleas' judgment against 
Thomas in the lease litigation, holding that he could not be held liable in his individual 
capacity.  TrizecHahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 930 A.2d 524, 539, 2007 Pa. Super. 196 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  Trizec appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
but it also discontinued the fraudulent transfer action against Thomas and Mary Claire.  
In July of 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court in the lease 
litigation, reinstating Thomas's individual liability.  TrizecHahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 
601 Pa. 637, 646-50, 976 A.2d 474, 479-81 (2009).  The Court of Common Pleas in the 
fraudulent transfer action thereafter granted Trizec's motion to strike its discontinuance of 
that action. 
 B.  Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court   
 Thomas filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on January 15, 2010, in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  He then removed the 
fraudulent transfer action to federal court, where it was docketed as an adversary 
proceeding in the bankruptcy court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1452; 28 U.S.C. § 157; Fed. R.  
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Bankr. P. 7001, and assigned to Bankruptcy Judge M. Bruce McCullough.  The 
bankruptcy court entered an order substituting Cardiello, the Chapter 7 Trustee, for 
Trizec, thus enabling the Trustee to pursue its right under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) to "avoid 
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable under applicable 
law by a creditor." 
 One of the fraudulent transfer theories the Trustee sought to prosecute in the 
bankruptcy court, and the only one at issue here, was constructive fraud.  In general, a 
transfer is constructively fraudulent as to a creditor if it is "made . . . without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer . . . and the debtor was insolvent 
at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer."  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5105; see also id. § 5104. 
 The Trustee's position as to how the law of constructive fraudulent transfer applied 
to Thomas's deposits was, and continues to be, based on the premise that "under 
Pennsylvania law, . . .  property held as tenants by the entireties is exempt from process 
by a creditor of only one spouse," In re Houck, 184 B.R. 21, 23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).  
So if a debtor spouse deposits his own funds into an entireties bank account and thus out 
of reach of his creditors, and receives nothing in return for that deposit from the non-
debtor spouse, he has "transfer[red]" funds without receiving "reasonably equivalent 
value" within the meaning of the PUFTA, and that transfer is therefore constructively 
fraudulent.  Plaintiff's Pretrial Statement, Sept. 15, 2010, at 3-4, Joint App'x at 158-59. 
 This rule, as the Trustee seems to have understood it, was subject to the single 
qualification that such deposits into an entireties account "are not fraudulent as 
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to . . . creditors to the extent th[e] funds are then used to satisfy reasonable and necessary 
expenses for the maintenance of said debtor's family."  See Plaintiff''s Post-Trial 
Memorandum, Nov. 29, 2010, Cardiello v. Arbogast, No. 10-2092-MBM, ECF #64, at 5 
(quoting In re Meinen, 232 B.R. 827, 842 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999)).  To make out its case, 
the Trustee planned to adduce evidence of all of Thomas's deposits of his salary into the 
Account as the universe of constructively fraudulent transfers, the amount of which could 
be reduced only through proof of later expenditures from the Account for "reasonable and 
necessary expenses."  
 This view of the applicable law was largely drawn from an opinion Judge 
McCullough himself had previously handed down, In re Meinen, supra.  But Judge 
McCullough apparently did not think In re Meinen governed the Trustee’s claims in this 
case.  Instead, he seems to have been persuaded, or perhaps thought himself bound, by 
the Pennsylvania state court’s approach in a fraudulent transfer action concerning one of 
Thomas's former partners.  The rule established there was that the debtor spouse's 
deposits into an entireties account were constructively fraudulent against creditors only if 
spent on luxury items for the exclusive benefit of the non-debtor spouse.  Apparently 
poised to apply this rule after trial, Judge McCullough entered a case management order 
directing the Trustee to specify which expenditures of funds from the Entireties Account 
it thought were spent on luxuries, undermining the Trustee’s desire to enter evidence of 
Thomas’s initial deposits into the Account. 
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 After discovery, Judge McCullough held a trial at which the parties litigated, as 
relevant here, four categories of alleged disbursements from the Entireties Account, 
totaling about $900,000.00: (1) checks drawn and deposited into an account owned solely 
by Mary Claire; (2) payments related to the Arbogasts' purchase and maintenance of a 
house in Florida; (3) membership fees for three different country clubs; and (4) premium 
payments towards various life insurance policies. 
 Before he could render a final decision, Judge McCullough died.  The case was 
reassigned to Western District Bankruptcy Judge Bernard Markovitz.  Judge Markovitz 
decided, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 63, to retry the case, and the retrial again focused on 
the four categories of expenditures listed above.  On February 7, 2012, Judge Markovitz 
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment resolving the Trustee's claims.  Cardiello 
v. Arbogast, 466 B.R. 287 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012).  Adopting, by and large, In re 
Meinen's and the Trustee's understanding of the law governing the case, but applying it to 
the evidence as limited by Judge McCullough's case management order, Judge Markovitz 
determined that there were $143,389.10 in constructively fraudulent transfers, based on 
disbursements related to the Florida residence and the country club memberships.  Id. at 
296, 302-04, 320.  Both parties appealed to the district court, that court affirmed, and the 
parties now renew their appeals here. 
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DISCUSSION 
 In bankruptcy cases, we "exercise the same standard of review as the District 
Court when it reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy Court."  In re Handel, 
570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).  "Thus, we review the Bankruptcy Court's findings of 
fact for clear error and exercise plenary review over the Bankruptcy Court's legal 
determinations."  Id. 
 I.  The Trustee's Appeal 
 A.  Exclusion of Evidence of Deposits into the Entireties Account 
 We address at the threshold the principal theme of the Trustee's counsel's 
presentation at oral argument before us: that the bankruptcy court's judgment is 
fundamentally flawed because the Trustee was precluded from introducing evidence of 
Thomas's deposits into the Entireties Account, and instead limited to proof of 
disbursements from the Account.  This limitation of the Trustee's proofs, counsel 
maintained, is so at odds with the law Judge Markovitz ultimately applied to resolve the 
fraudulent transfer claims that we must vacate the judgment and remand for retrial. 
 We have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the Trustee's understanding of the 
law.  But we decline to reach the merits of this argument because we conclude that it was 
waived.  "An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those 
purposes 'a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.'"  Laborers' Int'l Union of North Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 
26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)  (quoting Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 
1042, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991)  (opinion of Becker, J., announcing the judgment)); Fed. R.  
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App. P. 28; 3d Cir. R. 28.  Despite its centrality at oral argument, and although it is 
referenced elliptically in the Trustee's briefs, the issue of the evidentiary limitations the 
bankruptcy court allegedly imposed upon the Trustee does not appear as a ground for 
appeal in the "Statement of Issues" or "Argument" sections of the Trustee's brief; nor 
does the Trustee's brief mention the argument in its conclusion, which seeks only a 
"remand for a recalculation [of fraudulent transfer amounts]," not a new trial.  Appellant's 
Br. at 28.  We therefore conclude that this argument is not properly before us. 
 B.  Recovery Period 
 The first argument properly raised in the Trustee's briefing is that the bankruptcy 
court erred by limiting its recovery to transfers made between April 23, 2003, and April 
23, 2007.  The basis upon which the bankruptcy court did so is the PUFTA's four-year 
statute of repose, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5109.  The bankruptcy court interpreted this 
provision to limit the Trustee’s potential recovery to transfers during a four-year "look-
back period" stretching backwards from April 23, 2007, the date Trizec first filed the 
fraudulent transfer action in Pennsylvania state court.  See Arbogast, 466 B.R. 287, 300-
02.  The Trustee argues that the court erred insofar as it interpreted the PUFTA's statute 
of repose to preclude it from seeking relief for allegedly fraudulent transfers that took 
place after Trizec's April 23, 2007, filing. 
 Once again, the Trustee's argument may have theoretical merit.  But also once 
again, we ultimately do not reach it.  In a pre-trial conference held before Judge 
McCullough in this case, the court asked counsel for all parties, "While we're talking  
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about time frames, does anybody disagree that we've got four years we're dealing with 
here?"  Tr. of Hr'g, Oct. 14, 2010, at 42, Joint App'x at 194.  Counsel for the Trustee 
responded, "No, sir.  We don't."  Id. 
 "The chief purposes of the pre-trial conferences are to define and simplify the 
issues, to lessen surprise at trial and the risk of judicial error, to conclude stipulations on 
matters of evidence, and to promote settlements."  Price v. Inland Oil Co., 646 F.2d 90, 
96 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To these ends, "this court 
has . . . been willing to hold the parties bound by pre-trial representations."  Id. at 95.  We 
conclude here, as did the district court on appeal from the bankruptcy court's order, that 
the Trustee is bound by counsel’s unambiguous statement before Judge McCullough.  We 
therefore reject this ground for appeal.   
 C.  Burden of Proof 
Finally, the Trustee contends that the bankruptcy court erred in its allocation of the 
burden of proof with respect to whether the Arbogasts' expenditures from the Entireties 
Account were for "reasonable and necessary expenses for the maintenance of [the] 
debtor's family," Meinen, 232 B.R. at 842.  The bankruptcy court concluded that the 
burden of persuasion on this issue remained at all times with the Trustee, but did assign 
to the Arbogasts "the burden of producing at least some useful evidence regarding what 
the funds deposited into an entireties account are ultimately spent on."  Arbogast, 466 
B.R. at 308.  The Trustee argues that the law's exemption for constructive fraud purposes  
of funds later used for "reasonable and necessary expenses" constitutes an affirmative  
defense, and that the burden of persuasion should therefore have rested with the 
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Arbogasts.   
 Pennsylvania law appears to us to be silent as to whether the demonstration that 
funds were used for "reasonable and necessary expenses" is an affirmative defense or 
instead, a negation of the plaintiff's prima facie case.  See, e.g., Watters v. DeMilio, 16 
Pa. D. & C.2d 747, 752-53 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1957) (recognizing the rule, but offering no hint 
as to its nature).  Cases from other jurisdictions arising in similar legal contexts, however, 
have treated the subsequent use of transferred funds as going to the question of 
"reasonably equivalent value," that is, as negating that element of a plaintiff's prima facie 
case.  See United States v. Goforth, 465 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).  
And, as the bankruptcy court recognized, Arbogast, 466 B.R. at 307-08, Committee Note 
6 of section 5102 of the PUFTA specifically rejects the notion that the burden of proof  
with respect to whether "the transferor received reasonably equivalent value" should ever 
shift to the defendant.  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5102 cmt.6.*
 In any event, because the Arbogasts did indeed produce evidence at trial as to the 
uses to which funds from the Entireties Account were put, it seems to us highly unlikely 
that the bankruptcy court's allocation of the burden of persuasion made any difference in 
this case.  Cf. Ridley School Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) ("In a non-
 
                                                          
*  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has instructed that "[o]fficial comments are to 
be given weight in the construction of statutes," Lessner v. Rubinson, 527 Pa. 393, 398 
n.4, 592 A.2d 678, 680 n.4 (1991), a principle that is derived from Pennsylvania statutory 
law, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1939.  See also McGowan v. University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 
287, 298 & n.14 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing and applying the principle contained in 1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 1939). 
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criminal case, an error regarding the placement of the burden of persuasion will 
frequently be harmless.").  We therefore reject this ground for the appeal. 
 II.  The Arbogasts' Cross-Appeal 
 A.  Scope of "Reasonable and Necessary Expenses" 
 We read the Arbogasts' first ground for their cross-appeal to be that the bankruptcy 
court adopted an unduly narrow conception of what sorts of expenses are "reasonable and 
necessary . . . for the maintenance of [the] debtor's family."  Meinen, 232 B.R. at 842.  
They argue that this category of expenses should be understood to embrace expenses for 
anything other than luxuries.  So understood, the Arbogasts posit, the category of 
"reasonable and necessary expenses" should embrace the expenditures on the Florida  
residence and the country club memberships, and hence exempt them from the 
constructive fraudulent transfer calculation. 
 The Arbogasts cite no authority, nor have we found any ourselves, that suggests 
that "reasonable and necessary expenses" in this context means "expenses for anything 
other than luxuries."  Whatever the category's outermost perimeters, moreover, we can 
find no case extending it so far as to cover such non-essential expenses as vacation 
residences or country club memberships -- even if either is used from time to time for 
business purposes.  Cf. Watters, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d at 752 (referencing "food, clothing, 
medical expenses, taxes on . . . real estate . . . and interest paid on [a] mortgage" as 
reasonable and necessary); Goforth, 465 F.3d at 736 (approving use of funds on "food, 
clothing, utilities, gasoline, property taxes, and travel expenses" as reasonable and 
necessary).  And we see no reason that the law of fraudulent transfer should permit an 
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insolvent debtor to transfer his own funds out of the reach of his creditors -- frustrating or 
delaying attempts to recover a debt -- while still directing the use of those funds towards 
amenities of his choice.  We therefore affirm the bankruptcy court's decision that the 
payments towards the Florida residence and the country club memberships were not 
"reasonable and necessary expenses" within the meaning of Pennsylvania law. 
 B.  Reasonably Equivalent Value Through Satisfaction of Thomas's Debts 
The Arbogasts next argue that those funds deposited into the Entireties Account that were 
later used for membership fees at Thomas’s country clubs should not be treated as 
fraudulent transfers inasmuch as such payments were put towards satisfaction of 
Thomas’s debts to the clubs.  Payment in satisfaction of "antecedent debts," they point 
out, is included in section 5103 of the PUFTA’s definition of "value."  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5103.  And the question of "reasonably equivalent value," they continue, is generally 
one to be considered under the "totality of the circumstances."  In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F.3d 
139, 153 (3d Cir. 1996).  The Arbogasts maintain that in circumstances in which 
transferred funds are initially deposited into an entireties account, but eventually used 
towards satisfaction of a debt owed by the debtor that is of similar value to the funds 
transferred, the debtor receives "reasonably equivalent value" from the initial transfer, 
and such transfer would therefore not constitute constructive fraud. 
 The problem with this argument as applied to the facts of this case -- an initial 
transfer to an entireties account, followed by a transfer from that account towards 
satisfaction of a debt -- is that it treats the initial transfer to the entireties account as 
legally irrelevant.  It is not, inasmuch as that initial transfer places the funds out of all 
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creditors’ reach, and therefore, at the least, hinders or delays creditors seeking 
satisfaction of debts owed them.  Cf. Nostalgia Network, Inc. v. Lockwood, 315 F.3d 717, 
720 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing a similar argument in a related context, and explaining 
panel’s view that "the inquiry should stop at the first stage of the analysis, that is, should  
stop after it is determined that the [initial] transfer was not supported by consideration").  
It is true, of course, that the uses to which the funds are later put may also be relevant -- 
for example, through the exemption for funds spent on "reasonable and necessary 
expenses" addressed supra.  Similarly, insofar as a later received benefit, either direct or 
indirect, can be seen as being "as a result of" the initial transfer, it may confer 
"reasonably equivalent value."  Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 
635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991).   But we are aware of no authority suggesting that any later 
expenditure from a transferee that happens to confer some value upon the transferor 
sanitizes, for constructive fraud purposes, a transfer that was fraudulent when made.  We 
therefore reject this argument. 
 C.  Additional Post-Trial Hearing 
 Finally, the Arbogasts argue that the bankruptcy court erred by not holding an 
additional hearing after the trial at which they would have had an opportunity to 
demonstrate that funds from the Entireties Account that were used for expenses the court 
found not to be "reasonable and necessary" came from Mary Claire, and not Thomas, and 
therefore could not be counted as constructively fraudulent transfers.  They argue that the 
parties stipulated to such a hearing before Judge McCullough, and that Judge Markovitz 
was bound by this stipulation. 
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 Even if the parties did agree on such a hearing before Judge McCullough, we find 
nothing in the record to establish that the Arbogasts brought this to Judge Markovitz’s 
attention.  We conclude, considering the circumstances, that it was incumbent upon them  
to do so before they can assert that such a hearing was wrongly withheld.  We therefore 
reject this ground for appeal also. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
